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România la CEDO: Părinte ce suferă de o boală psihică, divorț și calendar de vizite (faptele Judecătoriei Baia-Mare și Tribunalului Maramureș). UPDATE: 10.000 de euro
24.02.2020 | Mihaela MAZILU-BABEL

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Mihaela Mazilu-Babel

Mihaela Mazilu-Babel

24 februarie 2020: Curtea Europeană a Drepturilor Omului, în unanimitate, a condamnat România din cauza faptelor instanțelor naționale, Judecătoria Baia-Mare și Tribunalul Maramureș, la plata a 10.000 de euro daune morale. Va urma o revizuire. Mai precizăm că deși reclamantul a fost reprezentat de un avocat, avocatul nu a solicitat cheltuieli de judecată pe rolul CEDO și nici anonimizarea. Mai cunosc detalii despre această cauză, dar cred că e suficient ceea ce am menționat anterior pentru a sublinia necesitatea specializării avocaților în drept CEDO, și aceasta mai ales în cazul în care reprezintă persoane vulnerabile:

Holds, unanimously,
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 10,000 (ten thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non‑pecuniary damage, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement, simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period, plus three percentage points;

:: hotărârea CEDO

***

03 mai 2019:

Secția a patra, CEDO

Cererea nr. xxxx/19
X.Y. împotriva României
(anonimizarea îmi aparține și nu pot oferi link spre HUDOC deoarece CEDO nu a anonimizat încă)
depusă la 9 ianuarie 2019 și comunicată la 29 martie 2019

I. Obiectul cererii (precum este redat de CEDO și tradus de mine repede cu ajutorul lui Google Translate)

Cererea se referă la restricțiile privind dreptul reclamantului de a lua legătura cu fiica sa de patru ani în timpul procedurilor de divorț și custodie. Reclamantul a afirmat că boala sa psihică a jucat un rol semnificativ în această restricție, chiar și atunci când nu există dovezi în fața instanțelor că el ar reprezenta o amenințare pentru bunăstarea fiicei sale. În plus, această restricție nu i-a permis să mențină relații personale cu fiica sa.

II. Întrebările comunicate părților

1. A fost încălcat dreptul reclamantului la respectarea vieții sale de familie, contrar articolului 8 al Convenției? În particular, calendarul de întâlniri stabilit de Judecătoria Baia Mare în decizia nr. xxx din 4 septembrie 2018 (menținut prin decizia finală nr. xxxx din 15 noiembrie 2018 a Tribunalului Maramureșului) limitează posibilitatea reclamantului de a menține și dezvolta relația cu fiica sa:
– din cauza timpului scurt pe care i-au permis să-l petreacă împreună: două ore în două seri pe săptămână;
– din cauza faptului că li s-a permis să se întâlnească doar în locuri publice și în prezența mamei.

2. A fost reclamantul discriminat pe motivul dizabilității sale, contrar articolului 14 din Convenție coroborat cu articolul 8 din Convenție, în exercitarea dreptului său de a menține contactul cu fiica sa în timpul procedurii de divorț și custodie (a se vedea , mutatis mutandis, K. și T. v. Finlanda, 25702/94, §§154-155 și 165, 12 iulie 2001, Petrov și X împotriva Rusiei, nr.23608/16, §§ 98-102, 23 octombrie 2018 și SS împotriva Sloveniei, nr. 40938/16, §84 în fine, 30 octombrie 2018)?

III. Jurisprudența CEDO relevantă invocată de chiar CEDO

3.1. K. și T. v. Finlanda, 25702/94, §§154-155 și 165, 12 iulie 2001

154. In determining whether the impugned measures were “necessary in a democratic society”, the Court will consider whether, in the light of the case as a whole, the reasons adduced to justify them were relevant and sufficient for the purpose of paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the Convention (see, inter alia, Olsson v. Sweden (no. 1), judgment of 24 March 1988, Series A no 130, p. 32, § 68).

In so doing, the Court will have regard to the fact that perceptions as to the appropriateness of intervention by public authorities in the care of children vary from one Contracting State to another, depending on such factors as traditions relating to the role of the family and to State intervention in family affairs and the availability of resources for public measures in this particular area. However, consideration of what is in the best interests of the child is in every case of crucial importance. Moreover, it must be borne in mind that the national authorities have the benefit of direct contact with all the persons concerned (see Olsson v. Sweden (no. 2), judgment of 27 November 1992, Series A no. 250, pp. 35-36, § 90), often at the very stage when care measures are being envisaged or immediately after their implementation. It follows from these considerations that the Court’s task is not to substitute itself for the domestic authorities in the exercise of their responsibilities for the regulation of the public care of children and the rights of parents whose children have been taken into care, but rather to review under the Convention the decisions taken by those authorities in the exercise of their power of appreciation (see, for example, Hokkanen v. Finland, judgment of 23 September 1994, Series A no. 299-A, p. 20, § 55, and Johansen, cited above, pp. 1003-04, § 64).

155. The margin of appreciation so to be accorded to the competent national authorities will vary in the light of the nature of the issues and the seriousness of the interests at stake, such as, on the one hand, the importance of protecting a child in a situation which is assessed as seriously threatening his or her health or development and, on the other hand, the aim to reunite the family as soon as circumstances permit. When a considerable period of time has passed since the child was originally taken into public care, the interest of a child not to have his or her de facto family situation changed again may override the interests of the parents to have their family reunited. The Court thus recognises that the authorities enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in assessing the necessity of taking a child into care. However, a stricter scrutiny is called for in respect of any further limitations, such as restrictions placed by the authorities on parental rights of access, and of any legal safeguards designed to secure an effective protection of the right of parents and children to respect for their family life. Such further limitations entail the danger that the family relations between the parents and a young child are effectively curtailed (see Johansen, cited above, ibid.).

It is against this background that the Court will examine whether the measures constituting the interferences with the applicants’ exercise of their right to family life could be regarded as “necessary”.

(…)

165. The Grand Chamber, for its part, considers it appropriate to examine the emergency care order and the normal care order for each child separately as they were different kinds of decision, which had different consequences – an emergency care order being of short, limited duration and a normal care order being of a more permanent nature – and which were the product of separate decision-making processes, even though one measure followed immediately after the other. In the Grand Chamber’s view, there are substantive and procedural differences to be taken into account which warrant examining the two sets of decisions separately.

3.2. Petrov și X împotriva Rusiei, nr.23608/16, §§98-102, 23 octombrie 2018 (doar un rezumat în limba română, disponibil aici)

98. In determining whether the refusal of custody or access was justified under Article 8 § 2 of the Convention, the Court has to consider whether, in the light of the case as a whole, the reasons adduced to justify this measure were relevant and sufficient. Undoubtedly, consideration of what lies in the best interests of the child is of crucial importance in every case of this kind. Moreover, it must be borne in mind that the national authorities have the benefit of direct contact with all the persons concerned. It follows from these considerations that the Court’s task is not to substitute itself for the domestic authorities in the exercise of their responsibilities regarding child custody and access issues, but rather to review, in the light of the Convention, the decisions taken by those authorities in the exercise of their (see Sahin v. Germany [GC], no. 30943/96, § 64, ECHR 2003‑VIII; Sommerfeld v. Germany [GC], no. 31871/96, § 62, ECHR 2003‑VIII (extracts); C. v. Finland, no. 18249/02, § 52, 9 May 2006; and Z.J. v. Lithuania, no. 60092/12, § 96, 29 April 2014). To that end the Court must ascertain whether the domestic courts conducted an in-depth examination of the entire family situation and of a whole series of factors, in particular of a factual, emotional, psychological, material and medical nature, and made a balanced and reasonable assessment of the respective interests of each person, with a constant concern for determining what the best solution would be for the child (see Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland [GC], no. 41615/07, § 139, ECHR 2010, and Antonyuk v. Russia, cited above, § 134).

99. The margin of appreciation to be accorded to the competent national authorities will vary in accordance with the nature of the issues and the importance of the interests at stake. Thus, the Court has recognised that the authorities enjoy a wide margin of appreciation, in particular when deciding on custody. However, stricter scrutiny is called for as regards any further limitations, such as restrictions placed by those authorities on parental rights of access, and as regards any legal safeguards designed to secure an effective protection of the right of parents and children to respect for their family life. Such further limitations entail the danger that the family relations between a young child and one or both parents would be effectively curtailed (see Sahin, cited above, § 65, and Sommerfeld, cited above, § 63).

100. Article 8 requires that the domestic authorities should strike a fair balance between the interests of the child and those of the parents and that, in the balancing process, particular importance should be attached to the best interests of the child, which, depending on their nature and seriousness, may override those of the parents. In particular, a parent cannot be entitled under Article 8 to have such measures taken as would harm the child’s health and development (see Sahin, cited above, § 66, and Sommerfeld, cited above, § 64).

101. The Court cannot satisfactorily assess whether the reasons advanced by the domestic courts were “sufficient” for the purposes of Article 8 § 2 without at the same time determining whether the decision‑making process, seen as a whole, was fair (see Sahin, cited above, § 68, and Sommerfeld, cited above, § 66). While Article 8 of the Convention contains no explicit procedural requirements, the decision-making process involved in measures of interference must be fair and such as to ensure due respect for the interests safeguarded by Article 8. The Court must therefore determine whether, having regard to the circumstances of the case and notably the importance of the decisions to be taken, the applicant has been involved in the decision-making process to a degree sufficient to provide him with the requisite protection of his interests (see Z.J. v. Lithuania, cited above, § 100, with further references).

102. Lastly, the Court considers that in conducting its review in the context of Article 8 it may also have regard to the length of the local authority’s decision-making process and of any related judicial proceedings. In cases of this kind there is always the danger that any procedural delay will result in the de facto determination of the issue submitted to the court before it has held its hearing. And an effective respect for family life requires that future relations between parent and child be determined solely in the light of all relevant considerations and not by the mere passage of time (see W. v. the United Kingdom, 8 July 1987, § 65, Series A no. 121; Sylvester v. Austria, nos. 36812/97 and 40104/98, § 69, 24 April 2003; and Z.J. v. Lithuania, cited above, § 100).

3.3. SS împotriva Sloveniei, nr. 40938/16, §84 în fine, 30 octombrie 2018

84. The Court further reiterates that the State has in principle an obligation to enable the ties between parents and their children to be preserved (see Kocherov and Sergeyeva, cited above, § 92). Indeed, the Court has previously found that the fact that a child could be placed in a more beneficial environment for his or her upbringing would not on its own justify a compulsory measure of removal from the care of the biological parents; other circumstances must exist pointing to the “necessity” for such an interference with the parents’ right under Article 8 of the Convention to enjoy a family life with their child (see S.H. v. Italy, no. 52557/14, § 56, 13 October 2015, and K. and T. v. Finland [GC], no. 25702/94, § 173, ECHR 2001‑VII). The authorities’ role in the social welfare field is, precisely, to help persons in difficulty, to provide them with guidance in their contact with the welfare authorities and to advise them, inter alia, on how to overcome their difficulties. In the case of vulnerable persons, the authorities must show particular vigilance and afford increased protection (see S.H. v. Italy, cited above, § 54, and Akinnibosun v. Italy, no. 9056/14, § 82, 16 July 2015). (s.n. – M.M.-B.)

dr. Mihaela Mazilu-Babel


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